Доклад Московской Хельсинской Группы о русских националис

Доклад Московской Хельсинской Группы о русских националис

According to this law, regional authorities are not entitled to introduce such prohibitions; and the Mayor’ s administration “was driven by emotions,” namely, letters from anti-fascist and human rights organizations, who are themselves “objects of a lawsuit.”Nationalist Radicals in Contemporary Russia: Ideology, Activities, and Relationship to the Authorities

Nationalist-radical parties and movements (1) make up a significant part of the political system of today’s Russia. But the place they occupy in the political scene is rather distinctive.

On the one hand, radical nationalists openly state that they have set for themselves the tasks of comprehensively transforming society and changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation. Their propaganda and actions are either balanced on the brink of overstepping the law or sometimes, actual violation of law. Radical nationalist-patriots realize that they cannot achieve their goals through “normal” parliamentary methods restricted as they are by federal legislation and therefore engage in alternative, non-parliamentary methods in waging their struggle. Some groups and their leaders openly favor the idea of attaining power by means of an armed coup and revolutionary rhetoric is an important part of the activities of nearly all nationalist-radicals.


On the other hand, nationalist organizations took part in the elections and promoted their views, sometimes very extreme ones, practically without having to face any obstacles at all until the late 1990s. Authorities’ attempts to counter nationalist-radicals became more or less systematic only at the end of 1998. During essentially the whole of the first post-Soviet decade, anti-fascists were justifiably criticizing the authorities for their passive conduct, lack of political will and even open connivance in favor of radicals who were engaged in very aggressive and at times illegal activities. There is no doubt that this dramatically destabilized the political situation in the country and was damaging to Russia’s image internationally. The increased activity of nationalist-radicals with the connivance of the authorities combined with general social instability in the country and wide-spread vengeful feelings in the early 1990s generated a pessimistic (if not “panic” inspiring) idea of “Weimar Russia,” similar to Weimar Germany.

There is no doubt that the situation changed somewhat by the year 2000. However it is clear that the state’s opposition to nationalist-extremists is basically situational. Sometimes specific measures by officials were rather ambiguous, ethically and legally. The fact that radical nationalist-patriots’ influence upon society has considerably diminished is only in part explained by the interference of the authorities. To a much greater extent this is a result of changes in the social and political life of the country as a whole and the evolution of nationalist-extremists in particular.

This article deals with, first, the internal dynamics of the activities of radical nationalist-patriots during the years 1990–2002, and second, with specific actions on the part of the authorities, aimed at countering extremists during this time period. The developments in recent years are of special interest to us.


NATIONALIST-RADICALS: GREAT HOPES AND GREAT DISAPPOINTMENTS

There is no doubt that the scope of this article prevents a detailed description of all aspects of the radical nationalist- patriots’ activities. Those who wish to have more information may consult the very detailed analytical materials published by the “Panorama” Information and Research Center (2). Also, there is some literature in English (3) and French (4) which provides an overview on Russian radical nationalist-patriots.

This article looks primarily into the general ideology and organizational forms of nationalist-radicals, the extent of popularity of their ideas in society, and their illegal activities.


WHO IS WHO: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NATIONALIST-RADICALS

Despite their ideological diversity, radical nationalist-patriots can be hypothetically subdivided into several main categories.

Naturally, nationalist-patriotic organizations can be grouped by their political views: their view of Russia’s ideal political system, (monarchists, nationalist-republicans, etc.) their interpretation of the nature of a national state, (ethnic nationalists, supraethnic empire nationalists) religious leanings, (Orthodox fundamentalists, neopagans, non-religious nationalists) views on property ownership, (ranging from Nationalist-Bolsheviks and nationalist-socialists to proponents of aggressive national capital) etc. If we base our classifications on the above parameters we achieve maximum accuracy but fail to provide an integrated picture of what nationalist-radicals are like in today’s Russia.

In order for us to draw such a picture of the nationalist-radical movement, we shall embark on the simplified path of dividing this movement into “old” and “new” right-wingers (5). Such a division is based on the most general, informal indices of outlook, rather than program-oriented characteristics. The key parameter which helps distinguish between “new” and “old” right-wingers is the degree of revolutionary drive, not in political programs but as a mind-set. As a rule, revolutionary consciousness means the establishment of paramilitary detachments, readiness to resort to violence, apology for war, and aggressive fanning of inter-ethnic discord in propaganda.

This broad approach to classification based on mentality and specific features of behavior is indispensable since it is next to impossible to properly distinguish between those groups on the basis of political agendas, which are often rather academic. In this article we shall primarily examine the “new” right wingers — nationalist-revolutionari>es, (nationalist-socialists, Nationalist-Bolsheviks and outright fascists), not the relatively moderate (in comparison with the new generation) “old right-wingers” (“Black Hundreds,” Orthodox fundamentalists).

The Russian National Unity (RNE), headed by Alexander Barkashov, has remained for a long time the largest such organization.

RNE was established during the period between March 1990 (when a group headed by A. Barkashov and V. Yakushev withdrew from the Nationalist-Patriotic Front “Pamyat” (Memory)) and October of the same year (when the A. Barkashov — V. Yakushev tandem dissolved). October 16, 1990, is regarded as the official date of RNE’s establishment.

RNE ideology is a mixture of Black Hundreds nationalism and outright nazism. RNE members pursue aggressive anti-liberalism, anti-communism and anti-Semitism, cherish ideals of a pure Russian nation (the initial version of RNE program contained provisions on criminal prosecution for mixed marriages and the introduction of eugenics) (6) and Russian spiritual values (the Orthodox religion, but in its “true, initial form”). Stylistic imitation of German nazis by A. Barkashov’s people is obvious. Unambiguous associations are created by RNE symbols, which include a swastika, their way of greeting each other by a raised right hand, black uniforms etc. A. Barkashov did not hesitate to call himself a nazi and spoke with admiration about Hitler.

RNE functioned as a paramilitary organization. Its members wore uniforms, practiced sports that developed physical strength, and learned how to shoot. The organization’s leaders repeatedly stated that the organization’s members were preparing themselves for a civil war (7).

RNE was very active during the events of September-October 1993. The Barkashov detachment was one of the main units defending the White House and they were among the supporters of the dismissed Supreme Soviet. On October 3,1993, A. Barkashov and his fighters seized the City Hall (then located in the vicinity of the White House) in an assault.

In the mid-1990’s, RNE went through a period of intense development, but by 1998 the organization started to see some internal instability. Beginning in September 2000, RNE went through a number of serious schisms and actually ceased to exist as a single organization. Several major fragments of RNE claim the name of the initial organization, one group is called “Russian Revival,” another — “Slavonic Union” (Russian abbreviation — SS) (this organization claims to be a Moscow regional branch of the National Russian public movement of RNE, but it does not recognize A. Barkashov’s leadership. Many leaders of “alternative” versions of RNE are in a state of overt or covert confrontation with one another. Some regional RNE groups exist independently and do not maintain any communication with any central organization, others, on the contrary are in touch with alternate “RNE management.” Local RNE groups often coordinate their activities at the regional and interregional levels.

In the best years of the organization, RNE membership was most accurately estimated at around 15 000 active members (the registered number of members was even higher). The 2000 split in the party was accompanied by aggressive strife in the party management which resulted in a massive withdrawal of its members. At present the two main fragments of the former RNE (RNE-1 of A. Barkashov and RNE-2 of the Lalochkin brothers) account for 2 000–3 000 members each. Regional organizations of RNE operate in most of the regions of Russia and in Belarus, Latvia, Ukraine, and Estonia.

Leaders of the major fragments of RNE are the brothers Evgeny and Michail Lalochkin (“RNE-2” or “The Group of the Lalochkins”), Oleg Kassin and Yury Vasin (“Russia’s Revival”), Dmitry Demushkin (SS). In 2002, O. Kassin became Deputy Chairman of the “Revival” movement, (Chairman — State Duma member Evgeny Ischenko) and Yu. Vasin became Deputy-Chairman of the National Revival Party “People’s Will” (Chairman — Sergei Baburin). Some groups of the former RNE which were initially part of the “Russian Revival” have joined the National Party of Great Russia, (Leaders — Stanislav Terekhov, Boris Mironov and Alexander Sevastyanov) as well as some former members of the Slavonic Union’s management.

The newspaper Russky Poryadok (initial circulation fluctuated from 25 000 to 500 000 copies, but lately the paper has not been publishing more than one issue a year) is the official paper of RNE. There are some regional RNE publications as well. In 1999 Russky Poryadok’s registration was revoked by a court decision on the basis of an administrative pretext (details will be provided below), but in 2000 the newspaper was reregistered in Belarus and started to come out again. Control over the newspaper after the split was retained by A. Barkashov.

We can say for certain that RNE had its best times in the mid-90’s. The heroic halo of the “White House defenders” attracted radical nationalists to Barkashov’s organization — it was this very organization which managed to be among the few who directly benefited from the 1993 crisis. However, internal stagnation, an information policy detrimental to the organization, a passive stance during the elections on the one hand and pressure on the part of the capital authorities on the other resulted in RNE starting to plummet into oblivion in 1999–2000.

Another major radical-nationalist organization is the Nationalist-Bolshevik Party (NBP).

NBP leader is Eduard Limonov, from whom Anatoly Tishkin took over after his arrest in April of 2001.

NBP has about 7 000 members and official branches in 51 regions of Russia. The first NBP Convention was attended by party representatives from 38 regions. NBP branches also operate in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Ukraine.

The newspaper Limonka is the official party publication, with a circulation of about 10 000 copies. It comes out once every two weeks. There are also a number of regional publications.

NBP established itself gradually, between November 1992, when a group of radicals headed by E. Limonov and A. Arkhipov withdrew from V. Zhirinovsky’s party (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) and formed the Nationalist-Radical Party (which subsequently split into two “camps,” Limonov’s and Arkhipov’s) and November 1994, when the first issue of Limonka was published. November 28, 1994, is regarded as the official date of the party’s founding.

The peculiar feature of NBP is its pro-Soviet orientation and cultural (and to a lesser degree — etatist) rather than ethnic nationalism. The main symbol of the party is a black hammer and a black sickle in a white circle against a red background. NBP activities focus on the protection of the Russian population on territory of the former Soviet Union. NBP members (both from Russia and from local groups in former Soviet states) take an active part in various events, (often illegal and at times, overt acts of hooliganism) which, in the opinion of Nationalist-Bolsheviks, are aimed at protecting the Russian population’s interests in Latvia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Although these actions, as a rule, do not have any direct effects, they attract public attention to the problem, which in the long run results in growing popularity for the party. Among the best known actions are non-violent protests by Nationalist-Bolsheviks in Latvia (seizure of the bell tower of St. Michael’s Cathedral in Riga in 2001), in the Crimea (seizure of the Sailors’ Club tower in Sebastopol in 2000), and the support given to Russian separatists in Northern Kazakhstan (a failed uprising of Cossacks in Kokchetav in 1997).

NBP was registered as an interregional organization in early 1997 and then reregistered on February 9, 1998. Despite repeated attempts, NBP failed to obtain national Russian registration.

Although NBP can hardly be called a broad-based organization, it has managed to occupy its own political niche. Due to its flamboyant style and successful propaganda, the party has had a considerable impact on Russian youth, who are not always nazi or communist-oriented. NBP had been actively developing until the late 1990s, restricted only by external factors i.e., the lack of national Russian registration, for instance. The arrest of NBP leadership in April 2001 and pressure from law enforcement agencies considerably hampered the work of the Nationalist-Bolsheviks. To say that NBP has been destroyed by repression would be an overstatement; though beyond any doubt the Nationalist-Bolsheviks cannot be as active and potent as they were in the past, particularly in the current environment of active opposition by the authorities and law enforcement.

Apart from NBP and RNE other “new right-wingers” have failed to expand their activities to the national stage. Nevertheless, some organizations in the radical right-wing part of the political spectrum are rather noteworthy.

Of those organizations still active, one of the most dynamic is the overtly racist People’s National Party (NNP) of Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevsky. The party numbers 500–700 members. Party organizations officially exist in 38 regions. The central party newspaper is Ya–Russky (circulation of 15 000, periodicity — one or two issues a month). NNP’s particular feature is its work with skinheads — teenage racists (8). The skinhead movement represents a relatively significant trend in youth subculture. Their numbers are sizable and their worldview has as its base, an aggressive racism. The skinheads’ main occupation is assaulting representatives of various ethnic minorities (people from the Caucasus, Roma, foreign students from Africa and Asia, etc.). Sometimes such actions turn into large-scale pogroms. The most notorious and bloody of the skinheads’ recent actions was the Tsaritsino marketplace pogrom in October of 2001.

Skinheads themselves are not a political movement, but Nationalist-Radicals recruit them as “soldiers.” Yet not all organizations succeed in this because teenage skinheads detest party discipline, avoid ideological intricacies and maintain that parties, unlike themselves, talk much but do very little. NNP is a rare example of a nationalist party working successfully with skinheads.

NNP Deputy Chairman, Semyon Tokmakov is a skinhead, who became “famous” in 1998 because he beat up a black security guard at the US Embassy in Moscow. S. Tokmakov, who joined the party in 1999, right after he was released from prison, brought with him a sizeable number of skinheads. In actuality, it was at that moment that teenage skinheads became the backbone of NNP.

The specific feature of NNP propaganda is its radicalism, especially by perpetuating anti-Semitic and anti-Caucasus stereotypes. At present, the party leader is being sued for inciting ethnic hostility.

There is another party which actively works with skinheads, Yury Belyaev’s Party of Freedom, (PS) — before 2000 it was the National-Republican Party of Russia, (NRPR) formed as a result of the split of Nikolai Lysenko’s party with the same name — with its headquarters in St. Petersburg. In Northwestern regions of Russia (Leningrad region, Pskov region) PS is one of the main nationalist-radical parties. With the help of the former leader of the St. Petersburg branch of NBP, Andrei Grebnev, who joined Yu. Belyaev in 2000, PS managed to attract skinheads and get them involved in party activities. Today, A. Grebnev is the chief editor of the PS daily, Nashe Obozrenie (circulation — approximately 10 000 copies).

In the mid-1990s, in Moscow and several other cities (St. Petersburg, Yaroslavl), the most radical of all legal nationalist organizations — the Russian National Union (RNS) of Konstantine Kasimovsky was quite prominent. The membership of RNS was never very numerous (at its height it numbered 150–200 members in Moscow), but the party’s active and aggressive propaganda was hard to overlook. Its main periodical, the newspaper, Shturmovik (in its prime, it was a weekly), was closed down by a court decision in 1998, not because of some formality, like Russky Poryadok, but actually because of its contents. In 1999, RNS leader and Shturmovik’s chief editor K. Kasimovsky was sentenced to two years imprisonment (suspended sentence) for promoting hatred between nationalities.

After this court judgment, K. Kasimovsky returned to his activities but became more cautious. RNS, which for a short time was called the Russian Nationalist-Socialist Party, now is named Movement “Russian Action” (RD). In fact, RD today consists of a group of ideologists (Kasimovsky himself, in the first place, Alexander Yeliseev and Viktoria Vanyushkina) who promote their views through the Pravoye Soprotivlenie newspaper, which is much less radical than Shturmovik. After the confrontation with law enforcement authorities, K Kasimovsky seems to have dropped his idea of coming to power “as a result of a civil war,” and modestly claims to be an ideologist of a future national revolution.

The 1990s saw repeated attempts to unite nationalist radicals. In 1996, for instance, the Radical Nationalist Party Coordination Committee (KSRNP) was established. It included NBP, NNP, Yury Belyaev’s NRPR, Georgy Shepelev’s New Public Russian Movement (NORD) and Oleg Bakhtiyarov’s Kiev Party of Slavonic Unity (PSE). The basic objective of this coalition was to determine the platform of the nationalists in the presidential election of 1996 (see below). After the election, KSRNP practically ceased to exist.

The most recent attempt of this kind has been the establishment of the National Party of Great Russia (NDPR). Initially the documents of the NDPR organizational committee were signed by representatives of many, if not most of the nationalist-radical groups. NDPR began publishing the Russky Front newspaper in the form of special editions whose editors were members of the organizational committee (Ya–Russky, Nazionalnaya Gazeta, Soyuz Ofitserov). However, after internal conflicts during the founding convention of the party in February 2002 only several initial members of the organizational committee joined NDPR. The convention elected S. Terekhov, A. Sevostyanov and B. Mironov as Co-Chairmen of the party. NDPR plans to get national Russian registration and to take part in the parliamentary elections of 2003. But it is obvious that the party organizers will hardly manage to unite all radical nationalists, and the party is very unlikely to succeed. Nationalists critical of NDPR are of the opinion that the attempt to establish a single nationalist party was initiated by communists to force nationalist-radicals to drop their claim of an independent political role.

“Old right-wingers” appear more moderate than revolutionary minded “new right wingers.”

We may label neo–Black Hundreds (“neo” in a very tentative way since they follow pre-revolutionary Russian conservative ideology without any, or just slight, modifications) and Orthodox Church fundamentalist groups as “old right-wingers.” In this article, Black Hundreds are of lesser interest to us since illegal activities on their part are much less intense than the actions of the “new” nationalist-radicals. Accordingly, relations among the former are much less conflict-ridden. Nevertheless, it pays to briefly describe the evolution of “old right-wingers” in the 1990s.

During the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Black Hundreds seemed to hold a rather strong position. They had an impressive political history, claiming to have preserved continuity with pre-revolutionary Russian Nationalists through emigrants and dissident groups. “Old Right-wingers” were among the very few groups (practically the only group) that by late 1991 had a clear vision of what an ideal Russia might be like. In the late 1980s — early 1990s, public consciousness changed in a direction favorable for the Black Hundreds i.e., idealization of Tsarist Russia, revival of the Orthodox Church, increased interest towards Russia’s cultural heritage.

However, the strength of the Black Hundreds soon turned into their weakness. Dogmatically restrained by the ideological heritage of pre-revolutionary organizations, anti-Semitic paranoia, excessive attention to history at the expense of contemporary realities, sectarianism, conservatism, and their inability to function in a principally new political environment, “Old right-wingers” could not but face a decline. The most active of their leaders began withdrawing from the Black Hundreds groups (mainly from Dmitry Vasilyev’s Nationalist-Patriotic Front “Pamyat,” which happened to be a real “forge for the production cadres,” of right wing radicals) and forming new organizations. The new organizations were, as a rule, even more radical and looked to the European fascist experience, rather than to pre-revolutionary conservatism. Incipient associations of nationalists (shaded with the Soviet state patriotism) and Alexander Sterligov’s Russian National Council, had completely disintegrated by the mid-1990s.

“Old right wing” groups (Dmitry Vasilyev's “Pamyat,” Alexander Shtilmark’s Black Hundred, various monarchist groups) still exist and continue to influence some sectors of the population, but they are deep in crisis and have been pushed to the margins of the political process. The only sphere of public life where the platform of the Black Hundred continues to resonate is in pseudo-religious Orthodox organizations. Organizations like the Union of Orthodox Brethren, the Union of Orthodox Citizens, the Union “Christian Revival” and most recently, the Union of Orthodox Gonfalon Carriers provide examples of pseudo-religious activity. Most of the popular Orthodox publications (newspapers Russky Vestnik, Rus Pravoslavnaya, and the Russky Dom magazine) occupy “old right-winger” positions of fundamentalist nationalism.

However, the mentality of “old right-wingers” is such that radical ideology is rarely translated into extremist activities. Therefore, while reviewing the activity of the nationalist-radicals (participation in elections and illegal activities), “new right-wingers” hold more interest for us.


ELECTION PARTICIPATION

Electoral statistics provide important information about the popularity of nationalist-radical organizations and their chances of constitutionally coming to power in the country.

In the State Duma of 1993–1995 there was only one nationalist-radical (in the fullest sense of the word) representative, i.e., Nikolai Lysenko, who won election in a single-mandate constituency in the Saratov region. However, no radicals could repeat the NRPR leader's success in later federal level elections.

The first time a nominee of the overtly fascist movement RNE ran for the State Duma was during the run-off elections on October 30, 1994, in the single mandate Mytishchi constituency №109. Alexander Fedorov won 5.92% of the votes, which guaranteed him sixth place out of 12 contenders. This result happened to be the best obtained by an RNE candidate in federal elections for all the following years. At that time, however, RNE leadership hoped to win, and after A. Fedorov's defeat, stated that he was not an official nominee of the movement. A. Fedorov took it as an insult, withdrew from RNE and established his own organization, which since 1998 has been called the Russian Patriotic Popular Movement (RNPD).

The State Duma elections of 1995 in the federal election district (i.e., party lists) featured the equally unsuccessful attempts of a number of nationalist-patriotic associations. The only actually radical organization listed on the ballot was N. Lysenko’s NRPR which won 0.48% of votes.

Some nationalist-radicals ran for the State Duma in single-mandate constituencies with similarly poor results.

RNE nominees were running in two Moscow constituencies (Yury Kapralny in the Universitetsky constituency №201 and Larisa Dementyeva in the Babushkinsky constituency №192) in the Dzerzhinsky constituency №85 of the Kaluga region, (Alexander Ushakov), in the Vladimir constituency №66, (Mikhail Borovkov) and in the Stavropol constituency №55 (Andrei Dudinov).

Yu. Kapralny got 0.62% (16th place out of 17 candidates), L. Dementyeva — 2.53%, (9th place out of 23) A. Ushakov — 1.43%, (13th place out of 15 candidates) A. Dudinov — 1.51% (14th place out of 20).

Former member of RNE Alexei Vedenkin, who was running in a single- mandate Lubertsy constituency №107 of the Moscow region got 1.93% of votes, securing 12th place out of 14 candidates.

E. Limonov’s and Alexander Dugin’s attempts to get seats in the State Duma through a single mandate constituency were equally unsuccessful.

The nationalist-radicals’ participation in the 1996 election was a complete failure as well.

A determined group supported the candidacy of A. Barkashov. RNE members actively collected signatures for him but in April the organization’s leader stated that he was not running and the signatures were not submitted to the Central Election Commission (TsIK).

Other nationalist-radicals, comprsing the aforementioned KSRNP, attempted to decide on a nominee for the upcoming presidential elections. After a short period of uncertainty (at first, nationalist-radicals even stated that they supported B. Yeltsin, then the President of the country), KSRNP introduced their nominee for the presidency — legendary weight lifter, writer and public figure Yury Vlasov. Despite the fact that Yu. Vlasov submitted to the Central Election Commission the required number of signatures in support of his candidacy, his participation in the elections was a complete failure, he gained only 0.25% of votes.

The main nationalist-radical organizations (RNE and NBP) failed to get national Russian registration, no matter how hard they tried and consequently they were not entitled to run in federal districts. NBP tried to join the bloc of Victor Anpilov’s “Working Russia” and Stanislav Terekhov’s “The Officers’ Union,” (at first, this association was called “The Front of Working People” and then “Stalin’s Bloc”) but NBP representatives were not listed as the bloc’s nominees.

Members of RNE leadership were nominated as candidates from the “Spas” Movement,” whose registration was cancelled by a court decision on the eve of the elections (details are provided below).

The Black Hundreds’ association, “Russian Deed” had some candidates on the ballot but they managed to win only 0.17% of votes in the federal district in which they ran.

In addition, RNPD of A. Fedorov and the radical Orthodox-monarchistic movement “For Faith and Fatherland” of Father Nikon (Belavenets) had registered federal candidates, but they were unable to meet the time limits for opening an electoral bank account and thus could not participate in the election.

During the Duma election, RNE nominated several candidates in single-mandate constituencies (some of them did not publicize their party affiliation).

Fifteen nominees for single-mandate constituencies stated their RNE membership in official and unofficial documents; seven submitted documents for registration, and three were denied registration (in Karelia, the Voronezh region and Kaliningrad).

The election results of RNE were as poor as in 1995. Andrei Dudinov (Stavropol constituency №55) won 3.4% of votes; Sergei Galkin (Kavminvodobsky constituency №53 of the Stavropol territory) — 4.03% of votes; Nikolai Dengin (Kirov constituency №92) — 1.26%; Andrei Yeremin (Volzhsky constituency №68 of the Volgograd region) — 3.1%.

Anatoly Tishin, NBP candidate in the Mytishchi constituency of the Moscow region got 2% of votes.

Other radical nationalists ran in single-mandate constituencies with approximately the same results. Vladimir Miliserdov, leader of the Russian Party got 1.15% of votes. The leader of the Russian National Union, Igor Artemov, fared best of all. He won 14.94% of votes in the Vladimir region. Nikolai Bondarik, a rather prominent nazi from St. Petersburg, got 6.08% of votes. Both candidates were waging very aggressive and expensive campaigns but, despite rather broad support, lost the election. During the presidential election of 2000, nationalist-radicals did not even nominate their own candidate and called upon the electorate to vote for other candidates, (namely, for Vladimir Putin and Alexei Podberezkin, a rather moderate independent national patriotic ideologist) or against all candidates (9).

On the whole, we may state that today nationalist-radicals do not enjoy broad electoral support in Russia. This is related to both objective (the country is tired of radicalism; people want to live in stability; negative associations related to the second world war still exist) and subjective (lack of a sound financial base; the low level of propaganda carried out by nationalists; an initial orientation towards a non-parliamentary strategy) reasons.


ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF NATIONALIST-RADICALS

Electoral victory has never been the ultimate goal of right-wing radicals. Nationalistic organizations in Russia are not electable parties. However, nationalist-socialists and Nationalist-Bolsheviks do favor the types of activities addressed in the Criminal Code (10). Even the creation of paramilitary groups by a political organization exceeds the limits of current legislation and not a single nationalist-radical movement can practically do without them. Officially, those groups are referred to as “military-patriotic clubs,” sports clubs etc., but their structured chain of command, military uniforms and other details undoubtedly reveal that they are illegal paramilitary forces. Naturally, members of these detachments have not been idle, and what they have been doing has not been limited to legal or semi-legal activities. During the 1990s, nationalist-radicals were permanent characters in the criminal news columns, accused of various crimes — from illegal weapons possession to murders and racketeering. RNE members especially excelled in this.

The discrepancy between the declared “toughness” and the routine of party life sometimes disappointed rank-and-file party members. That is why it is no small wonder that despite the leadership’s emphasis on “being law abiding,” A. Barkashev’s fighters often resorted to violence against their political opponents and “enemies,” identified by their ethnicity. The cases of A. Barkashev’s opponents, representatives of ethnic and religious minorities being beaten up, are numerous. But often the crimes committed by A. Barkashov fighters had no “ideological” grounds. A. Barkashev’s people got too used to imagining themselves as the demonic “fascists,” portrayed in Soviet films, and turned into merciless murderers, hired killers, robbers, racketeers and sadists.

It is obvious that a large number of illegal deeds can be explained primarily by the mentality of RNE members. They are aggressive and inclined to violence. The movement’s leadership, on the one hand, tried to keep rank-and-file members from actions which could directly compromise the movement, but on the other hand, leaders attempted to harness their latent aggressiveness. “We believe that the golden moment will come when our fist strikes out in rage,” says the party anthem. The fighters were anticipating the leadership’s command indicating that it was time to start. The most impatient members did foolish things. Those who were more patient were making and purchasing arms.

The same typical features of illegal activities characterize practically all Russian right-wing radicals, members of the Russian Party, NRPR or RNS, for instance. There were also such outright terrorist right-wing radical organizations like the “Werewolf Legion” or “Heaven’s Aryans.”

Illegal actions of Nationalist-Bolsheviks are of a somewhat different nature. Crimes committed by NBP members have more ideology behind them. Often such actions are acts of hooliganism against political opponents or embassies of various countries, (this is a kind of a NBP “calling card”) or symbolic attacks on individuals. It is the Nationalist-Bolsheviks’ style to throw a bottle with paint (or a Molotov cocktail in the worst case) at an embassy building, an egg at the face of an opponent, or to strike the ex-president of the USSR across the face with a bunch of flowers for “ruining the country,” rather than beat up a person who does not look Russian. NBP leadership, basing their judgment on a rational analysis of the situation in the country, came to the conclusion that it is possible to counteract the national passivity and political indifference of the population in the post-Soviet environment by playing “the Russian card.” The party bulletin NBP-Info (1999, №3) published the “Second Russia” project, which recommended specific actions targeted against post-Soviet countries with sizable Russian-speaking minorities — Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and Latvia. Actions against those countries varied in nature. The most aggressive action recommended was attempting to gain control over some of those countries’ territory. The creation of a “Second Russia” was considered by Nationalist-Bolsheviks to be only the first stage of a national revolution in Russia itself. “To create a second Russia and then use it to move against the first.” In some other publication, E. Limonov wrote, “It is impossible to start a rebellion in Moscow for many reasons. The initial spark should be kindled outside Russia… It should be understood that the emergence of a conflict is not the ultimate goal, but only an indispensable first stage of an armed revolt to replace the powers in Moscow.” (11)

It is no coincidence that E. Limonov and his comrades were arrested on the territory of Altai, not far from the Kazakh boarder. After E. Limonov’s arrest it became obvious that the Nationalist-Bolsheviks were quite serious about statements like, “we shall organize revolts on the territories that we like and which are of vital importance to a Nationalist-Bolshevik empire. I basically mean Southern territories given away to CIS countries. There is only one country fit for the organization a guerilla base for the Russian liberation movement. That country is Kazakhstan … Obviously, it is there that guerillas must be sent.” (12)

The Stringer newspaper (February 2002, №3 and March 2002, №4) published the reminiscences of Artem Akopyan, one of the Nationalist-Bolsheviks who visited Altai. A. Akopyan’s article unambiguously indicates that NBP members were at the very least conducting reconnaissance on the Russian-Kazakh border. But it should be noted that following this article, a statement by NBP Central Council was published. The statement emphasized that everything reported by the author of the article was fictional. However, no obvious discrepancies or exaggerations could be pinpointed in the text. Besides, A. Akopyan’s information seems quite plausible for a different reason: E. Limonov himself did not try to conceal that in 1997 he went to Kokchetav with a group of his party comrades to take part in a separatist riot by Northern Kazakhstan Cossacks. The riot never occurred. Most likely, the statement by NBP Central Committee was triggered by the fact that the investigation into E. Limonov’s case was still ongoing and any word uttered without due caution might add evidence to prove E. Limonov’s guilt.


STATE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATIONALIST-RADICALS

In the late 1990s, after a long period of passivity and indifference towards even blatant violations of the law, politicians started to actively oppose nationalist-radicals. Since 1998 the authorities’ pressure on radicals has drastically increased. For the past two years this “clamp down” has been happening in the context of a more general change in the political life of the country and appears quite natural in this new environment.


Registration Denial

The first time nationalist-radicals ran into some obstacles in their activities was when they were trying to obtain national Russian registration. The registration was essential for an entitlement to take part in the State Duma elections in federal districts in 1999. Since only two nationalist-radical organizations — RNE and NBP — were indeed operating on a national scale, the following discussion deals with those two organizations. RNE convened a national Russian convention required for registration, in February 1997. By the end of the same year, the Ministry of Justice managed to deny RNE registration twice under various pretexts. Initially, having found some formal irregularities, the Ministry of Justice sent back RNE's charter-documents for revision. When the registration documents were resubmitted, the Ministry of Justice ruled that the registration procedure had been violated because amendments may be incorporated into a charter only by the convention and not by the Central Council, to which the convention transferred its powers. A. Barkashov’s organization decided to bring a complaint against the resolution of the Ministry of Justice in court. On January 5, 1998, the Tagansky district court refused to uphold the complaint, confirming that any modifications in the charter could be made only by the convention. On April 22, 1998, a Moscow city court refused to vacate the ruling of the Tagansky district court.

It should be noted that experts at the Ministry of Justice did not even try to prove that the program and propaganda materials of RNE contradict the RF Constitution and federal legislation, or that the use of the swastika in the party’s emblem and the formation of paramilitary units are illegal activities. Instead, they were trying to find formal errors, enabling them to find fault with the charter of the organization. In connection to this Sergei Stepashin, the Minister of Justice stated that if RNE attempted to register again, denial would be based on substance, not on form.

NBP's situation was exactly the same. The party held its national founding convention on October 1–2, 1998. On November 6, 1998, the Ministry of Justice denied the party registration because of faults with the charter and because of allegedly forged records of regional organizations. On November 14, NBP held a second “emergency” national convention, which introduced all necessary modifications into the charter. On December 18, the Ministry of Justice for the second time denied registration. On August 18, 1999, the Tagansky district court refused to grant relief to NBP on a complaint against the resolution of the Ministry of Justice.

However, the authorities’ pressure on RNE was not limited to denial of national registration. The leadership embarked on a policy of open conflict with the authorities in the capital, which took the form of a protracted lawsuit.

Doing their utmost to get national Russian registration and participate in the elections, RNE decided to hold their second convention, which was supposed to incorporate all necessary amendments into the charter. The convention was scheduled for December 19, 1998. But Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov made a decision to ban the convention. The anti-fascist drive of Yu. Luzhkov was, most likely, linked with the beginning of the election campaign. Yu. Luzhkov’s image during the campaign was supposed to be that of a respectable person with a good measure of toughness and democracy, balancing patriotism with anti-fascism. A command was given to raise a wave of public protest that would enable the authorities to prohibit the convention (13). After the rallies (initiated by the authorities) of indignant anti-fascists, the government of Moscow made a decision on December 15 to ban the convention, on the ground that it “posed a threat to Muscovites’ tranquil and safe life” (decision №951, dated December 15). Luzhkov stated that “such gatherings cannot be held now and will not be held in Moscow in the future.” (14)

It is obvious that the legal justification for the ban was equivocal. RNE was operating in Moscow legally and, in accordance with their registered charter, the organization was entitled to conduct their events within city limits. Thus, there were no formal grounds to prohibit the convention. Using this rationale, A. Bakashov stated his intent to turn to the prosecutor’s office with a complaint against the illegal decision on the part of the Moscow Mayor (15). Even the then FSB Director, Vladimir Putin, was doubtful about the legality of the Moscow government resolution, “while they (Barkashov’s organization) operate within the framework of current legislation, they are entitled to hold their events as long as they are legal. Law enforcement agencies must not act on the brink of illegality, let alone in violation of law.” (16)

On December 16, 1998, the Moscow prosecutor’s office replied stating that nothing illegal had been found in the resolution of the Moscow government. The sports hall “Ismailovo,” where the convention was supposed to take place, had been closed down for emergency repairs related to the “wrecked conditions of its chairs.”

After the scandal, RNE administration was promptly ousted from the Terletsky park on the formal ground of not complying with fire safety regulations. At the same time, tax police started an inspection of RNE’s security services with the aim of finding violations. Businessmen who used A. Barkashov’s men as security guards were given hints that they had better cancel their agreements.

On January 18, 1999, RNE started a law suit in a Moscow city court to have the convention ban cancelled. On February 11, 1999, the court refused to grant relief based on the complaint filed by RNE leadership. Moscow government legal council, Alexander Tarasenko, managed to prove that the goals stated in the charter did not correspond to the actual deeds of the movement.

In January 1999, the government of Moscow ruled that RNE emblem was a “nazi” one. This gave grounds to fine A. Barkashov’s people for carrying their badge and sleeve band, or for distributing their newspaper, under the Moscow law of January 15, 1997, “On Administrative Responsibility for Producing, Disseminating and Displaying Nazi Symbols in the Territory of the City of Moscow.” It should be noted that a year before that, in February of 1998, the Moscow prosecutor’s office had already examined RNE symbols for their similarity with the nazi ones (17). Experts studied the matter. According to the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, it is only the symbols of Germany of 1935 — 1945 that could be referred to as nazi symbols, that is a “black, diamond-shaped swastika in a white circle against a red background.” So, experts stated that in the context of this law, RNE emblems cannot be regarded as nazi symbols.” (18)

This resulted in a paradoxical situation: the authorities failed to clearly explain and justify the necessity of opposing nazis, a necessity obvious to everybody — to the authorities themselves, and to society. Instead, pretexts were used like “wrecked chairs” or non-observance of “fire safety regulations.” The fact that the militia were instructed to detain nazis instead of or along with “persons of Caucasus nationality” did not create the impression that what was happening was legal. It is absolutely obvious that the authorities were driven by political rather than legal motives.

In February of 1999, staff of the Moscow prosecutor’s office reinforced with OMON (special task police unit), searched RNE’s Moscow premises, including those which were registered by false organizations (for instance, parishes of the True Orthodox Church) (19). According to the Central Council of RNE, more than twenty searches were carried out in offices and apartments of RNE activists.

On March 26, 1999, the RF Supreme Court examined the complaint filed by the leadership of RNE against the decision of the Moscow city court issued on February 11, which ruled that the ban on RNE convention imposed by the Moscow city administration was legal. A. Barkashov’s representatives stated during the trial that any restrictions on the activity of a political organization can be imposed only on the basis of Federal Law “On Public Organizations.” According to this law, regional authorities are not entitled to introduce such prohibitions; and the Mayor’ s administration “was driven by emotions,” namely, letters from anti-fascist and human rights organizations, who are themselves “objects of a lawsuit.”

However, the court dismissed the complaint by referring to Federal Law “On the Status of the Capital.”


Ban On Existing Organizations

On March 3, 1999, Moscow Prosecutor, Sergei Gerasimov, filed with the Moscow city court an application to cancel RNE’s Moscow registration. According to the data collected by the prosecutor’s office, “the activities of RNE contradict the charter requirements and objectives of the organization, requirements of the RF Constitution, federal laws and other regulatory acts.” On the same day, the Moscow City Duma adopted the law on the responsibility for producing, disseminating and displaying “any images resembling the nazi swastika.”

On April 16–19, 1999, the Community Center of Severny settlement hosted a session of the Butyrsky district court of the city of Moscow, which examined the application by the Moscow Prosecutor. A. Barkashov’s activists faced charges related to such violations as distribution of their newspaper at improper locations, involvement of juveniles in political activities, as well as projecting the activities of the regional organization onto a neighboring district (The Moscow Region). It is quite easy to notice that in this case, as before, claims against RNE were absolutely formal. On April 19, Judge Marina Golubeva ruled that the Moscow Regional Chapter of RNE should be liquidated as a legal entity.

On April 22, the court cancelled the registration of the Russky Poryadok newspaper. The initial argument of the State Committee on Press was that the newspaper had not been released for more than a year. After RNE representative, S. Poluboyarov, showed the court documents testifying to the fact that the last year’s (the latest) issue had been regularly updated, the State Committee on Press reworded its claim. It came to light that the editorial board and the founder failed to submit to the Committee the charter or the agreement that replaces the latter, after the registration (in 1991!). The claim of the State Committee on Press was satisfied.

Despite the fact that RNE did not have its own registration, it made an attempt to take part in the elections as part of the duly registered national movement “Spas.” The list of candidates of the movement in federal districts, approved on October 18, 1999, and had A. Barkashov’s name at the very top.

Right after the list of candidates was submitted, the Ministry of Justice started a law suit to cancel the registration of “Spas.” The grounds for the suit were that in process of its registration “Spas” submitted incorrect information on its regional branches — ten of them were never discovered in the course of the relevant inspection. Despite the formal nature of the claim, it became obvious that those “Spas” problems emerged because of A. Barkashov. Minister of Justice, Yury Chaika, stated that, “persons who share fascist ideology cannot run for legislative bodies of power.” (20)

The appeal to the RF Supreme Court was lying there for a week, and then the complaint of the Ministry of Justice was dismissed for two reasons: first, there was no legal ground: there had not been a single warning notice; second, the Ministry of Justice should have sought relief in a lower court. The Supreme Court could have suspended activities of the organization only if these activities had contradicted the law: the Ministry of Justice’s mistake, which had registered a false organization, should have been corrected in the first court.

On November 2, 1999, the federal list of the “Spas” movement was registered by the Central Election Committee. The Ministry of Justice, in its turn, filed an action with the Zamoskvoretsky district court of the city of Moscow.

On November 9, 1999, the first court session took place. In order to accommodate for the Ministry of Justice all current cases were put aside. Normally, it takes several months to examine a suit after it is lodged (such was the situation with NBP’s claim against the Ministry of Justice which was lodged in December of 1998 and the case was examined only in August of 1999). On November 12, the court made the following decision: since the number of regional organizations is not sufficient, federal registration of “Spas” must be cancelled.

On November 16, 1999, “Spas” was sued for having forged some documents. The inspection conducted by law enforcement bodies revealed that in the process of the movement’s registration in 1998, falsified data on the number of regional branches were submitted.

“Spas” lawyers tried to file a suit against the decision of the Zamoskvoretsky district court, which supported the validity of the movement’s registration, but on November 24 the Moscow city court ruled that the decision had been correct.

On November 25, at the session of the Central Election Commission, “Spas” was deleted from the ballot (unanimously). On November 29, “Spas” representatives submitted a complaint to the RF Supreme Court against the decision of the Central Election Commission. On December 3, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against the Central Election Commission. On December 16, 1999, the Appeal Board of the Supreme Court confirmed that the “Spas” registration was cancelled on sound legal grounds. During voting on December 19, “Spas” was initially printed on the ballot but deleted by hand.

The victory of authorities over this nationalist-radical movement vividly demonstrated two things. First, it became obvious that existing legislation is sufficient to oppose nazis, given a certain political will. But, on the other hand, the story of banning RNE convention, registration cancellations in Moscow and “Spas” dismissal from the elections graphically revealed that bureaucrats lack the political culture and ability to respond to extremists in a clear and substantive way; their inclination is to resort to backstage manipulations.

Authorities’ “defeat” of RNE brought about an internal crisis in the movement, resulting in its split. The role of “Extremist Organization Number 1” was gradually taken over by NBP, and soon authorities and law enforcement bodies went after that organization as well.

In March 2001, Saratov NBP activists were approached by local supporters of A. Barkashov with an offer to buy several assault rifles. The deal was made; and on March 10, Nationalist-Bolsheviks bought two rifles, and then another four. The National-Bolsheviks who were trying to bring the rifles from Saratov to Ufa were arrested. The circumstances surrounding the case suggest that Barkashov’s people played the role of stool-pigeons. They were not even arrested. Arrested were Nina Silina, leader of the Vladimir branch of NBP and several party members from Nizhnii Novgorod and Saratov, namely, Oleg Laletin, Vladimir Pentelyuk and Dmitry Koryagin. A wave of searches swept NBP offices and the party activists’ apartments in Moscow and surrounding regions in late March.

On April 7, 2001, FSB arrested Eduard Limonov at an apiary, twelve kilometers from the village of Bannoye of the Ust-koksinsky district of the Altai territory. Eye-witnesses report that about a hundred people were involved in the arrest operation. Sergei Aksenov, founder of the Limonka newspaper, was arrested together with E. Limonov. On April 9, both Nationalist-Bolsheviks were taken to the Lefortovo jail on charges related to “the organization of an armed criminal group.” E. Limonov was suspected of preparing an armed mutiny in Northeastern Kazakhstan for the purpose of establishing a Russian autonomous republic there.

Initially E. Limonov and S. Aksenov were charged under Article 222, Section 3 of the RF Criminal Code (“illegal purchasing, keeping and transportation of arms”).

On September 6, 2001, E Limonov was also charged under Article 205, Section 3 (“terrorism committed by an organized group”), and Article 208, Section 1 (“establishment of an illegal armed formation and management of said formation”) of the RF Criminal Code. On November 28, 2001, E. Limonov had to face yet another charge under Article 280, Section 2 of the RF Criminal Code (“public calls to change the constitutional system of the Russian Federation made through the mass media”).

E. Limonov considers his arrest to be the result of a provocation on the part of FSB. In any case, even if the rifle deal was not staged by special services, E. Limonov’s involvement in purchasing rifles is practically impossible to prove.

On August 9, 2001, the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Justice for the Moscow Region lodged an action with the regional court requiring termination of NBP activities under a formal pretext. The claim was justified by the fact that the party is deprived of its legal address in connection with the liquidation of the organization which had provided the address, namely, the Association of the Veterans of Afghanistan in the town of Electrostal.

Bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice were sending notifications to the former address with instructions to submit information on NBP work. Failure to get answers became a formal pretext to sue the party. During the course of the legal proceedings, evidence proving that the party existed and had filed relevant documents in order to obtain a national registration was dismissed.

On September 27, 2001, the Moscow regional court accepted NBP argumentation, dismissed the request of the Ministry of Justice to recognize that Interregional Public Association “Nationalist-Bolshevik Party” ceased legal activity, and did not agree to delete this organization from the state register of legal entities. Representatives of the Ministry of Justice appealed the decision of the Moscow regional court to the RF Supreme Court, but the latter upheld the decision of the Moscow regional court.

On January 9–10, the Moscow regional court examined and dismissed another action lodged by the Moscow regional prosecutor’s office to liquidate NBP. The prosecutor’s office maintained that NBP violated Article 16 of Federal Law “On Public Organizations,” namely prohibiting activities of organizations whose objectives or actions are aimed at forcible change of the constitutional system in the Russian Federation. Representatives of the prosecutor’s office used the Limonov case as proof. However, the court agreed with the reasoning of NBP legal council, Sergei Belyak, who insisted that one cannot make decisions proceeding from files of the case which is not yet completed, and the use of such materials is a gross violation of the principle of the secrecy of investigation. The court suspended the prosecutor’s office case until the Limonov case was completed.

By March 2002, the investigation of the Limonov case had been completed. Defendants started to familiarize themselves with the case files while awaiting trial.

After the arrest of its leaders, NBP continues to function, but the party activities have considerably decreased. Nationalist-Bolsheviks cannot continue launching their campaigns the way they did in the past, because now law enforcement agencies pay very close attention. They find it difficult to pursue their former aggressive extremist propaganda; a careless word may affect the investigation and court proceeding in the Limonov case.

Nationalist-radicals were operating absolutely freely in Russia for a long time. They called for changing the constitutional system, continuously violated Russian legislation, and until the late 1990s had not faced any significant resistance from authorities or law enforcement bodies. Public opinion held that existing legislation has no means of curbing extremist activities and propaganda.

The events of 1998–2002 showed that given political will, current legislation is sufficient to at least bar radicals from election participation and to prosecute the most extreme and arrogant nazis. But the same events revealed the reverse side of the problem — authorities are fighting extremism using formal pretexts, and only given an “appropriate” political environment. No doubt, the relationship between authorities and nationalist-radicals is part of a more global problem of the state of legal norms in the Russian Federation today. A law in this country is fully and effectively implemented only when the authorities decide to use it, and often only against those who failed to accommodate the authorities in some specific way.


http://www.mhg.ru/english>1FF906E